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Dhe importance of the lack of land redistribution cannot be overstated.
Historian Paul Cimbala writes, "Once established on property of their
own, [former slaves] believed, they would be truly free to pursue
additional goals [such as wealth accumulation and political
participation] without constantly worrying about offending those who
othenvise have been paying them wages. "WE. B. Du Bois argued that
Y White America had mnade good on the promise of land repatriation to
Blacks, "it would have been the basis of real democracy in the United
States. "'
Dalton Conley, in his book Being Black and Living in the Red, quotes
other African-American scholars on the impact that land redistribution,
the promised 40 acres and a mule, might have had on the economic state
of the African-American community and race relations in America. He
* J.D. 2003 Candidate, Colunbia University School of Law; B.A., 1999, Morehouse
College. A special thanks to Professor Francis Ssekandi for his helpful comments and to
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1. DALTON CONLEY, BEING BLACK AND LIVIN; IN THE RED: RACE, WEALTH AND SO-
CIAl. POLICY IN AMERICA 33 (1999).
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asserts that giving land, the most tangible of assets, to the newly freed
slaves would have given them a basis for creating wealth and helped to
overcome the economic disparity that is the source of much racial ten-
sion. The failure of the U.S. government to make good on its promise of
redistribution combined with decades of exclusionary economic practices
helped to perpetuate the socio-economic marginalization of Blacks and
tension between the races in America.
The frustration of being marginalized in a country where you are a
numerical and racial minority, where the government therefore does not
necessarily represent your interests, is obviously severe. The marginaliza-
tion of Blacks has periodically sparked race riots in some of America's
inner cities.' However, Black Americans can only begin to fathom the
sense of betrayal felt by Blacks in post-colonial Africa; the experiences of a
numerical and racial majority marginalized by a government, which is
supposed to represent the majority's interests.
INTRODUCTION
Under colonial rule, millions of Africans were dispossessed and ex-
ploited by the European powers.' A socio-economic structure was
established where White settlers controlled the vast majority of land and
other resources while Black Africans were left to live in poverty, serving
only as a source of cheap labor. As colonialism gave way to independence
in the second half of the twentieth century, the newly freed Africans, par-
ticularly in rural areas, were full of hope that the transitional governments
would immediately dismantle this socio-economic structure and restore
property to Black Africans and facilitate their rise out of poverty. Many
also believed that economic parity would serve as a means of promoting
2. See Shannon Elizabeth Rush, Sharing Space: Why Goodwill Isn't Enough, 32 CONN.
L. REV. 1,34.
The Watts riots in the 1960s illustrate the profound rage blacks felt about
their subordination ... Watts was followed by at least 250 more riots in
1967, a forceful message by black America that it had enough of white
denial, white privilege, and persistent inequality ... white America was
given anotherWatts- type message in the 1992 Los Angeles riots.
Id.
3. See Robin Palmer, Robert Mugabe and the Rules of the Gaine, (July 2000) at
http://w-vw.oxfam.org.uk/landrights/RuleGame.rtf [hereinafter Rules of the Gaie]. Un-
der colonial rule in Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa "millions of people were
uprooted from their ancestral lands, often with deliberate cruelty, and always without being
paid any compensation." Id. at 1.
4. See Lauren G. Robinson, Rationales for Rural Land Redistribution in South Africa, 23
BROOK.J. INT'L L. 465,466-67 (stating that dispossessed blacks in South Africa were left in
poverty and "coerced into a system of cheap migrant labor").
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reconciliation between privileged Whites and impoverished Black
Africans.'
What most Black Africans did not realize was that the conditions of
the transfer of power forced many new African governments to recognize
land rights created under colonial rule as legitimate." Furthermore, after
the murder of Patrice Lumumba in Zaire, many African leaders feared
reprisal from Western powers that may have perceived radical socio-
economic restructuring as Communism.7 In places such as Zimbabwe
there was also the threat of attacks from military forces still controlled by
White settlers. Thus African governments could not simply take land as
the colonists had done years before. In response, various creative programs
were developed to facilitate the redistribution of land, most enjoying very
limited success.
. In South Africa, the legacy of Apartheid left eighty-seven percent of
the country's land in the hands of the White minority while Blacks were
forced to live in the squalor of over-crowded townships.! Following the
transition to true democracy, many Blacks expected the African National
Congress (ANC) led government to take steps to eliminate the disparity
in land ownership and create opportunities for Blacks to overcome pov-
erty on a massive scale." The Reconstruction and Development Program
(RDP), created in 1994, promised to redistribute 30% of agricultural land
within five years. Unfortunately, by 2000, less than 3% of targeted lands
5. But cf Samuel Kariuki, Creating the Black Farer, DAILY MAIL & GuARiDAN, Sept.
26, 2000 ("in countries undergoing a transition to democracy, land is often a nechanism
used to mediate the dialectics of reconciliation and transition over and above the need to
effect meaningful and radical agrarian transportation").
6. See Rules of the Game, stipra note 3, at 1. Speaking of the agreements made by new
democratic regimes in Africa, Palmer states, "these compromises justified, legalized and
froze in time all that had gone before-a century of white land grabbing in Zimbabwe
and Namibia, even longer in South Africa." Id.
7. Palmer explains that the capitulation on the land issue in Zimbabwe can be linked
to
the often pathological Western fears that Africa might turn Communist. A
line can be traced from the murder of Lunurnba, through support for fas-
cist Portugal's continued control of its colonies, support for Moi in Kenya
and Savimbi in Angola, to the historic compromise with Robert
Mugambe (and allies) in Lancaster House in 1979.
id.
8. See Robinson supra note 4, at 475 (stating that South African Land Acts only al-
lowed Blacks access to 13.6% of the country's surface area).
9. Edward Lahiff, Land Reform in Souith Africa: Is it Meeting the Challenge? 1
(Program for Land and Agrarian Studies, Policy Brief No. 1, Sept. 2001) at http://
xvww.oxfam.org.uk/landrights/PLAAS1 .doc ("With the transition to democracy, expecta-
tions were high that an African National Congress (ANC)-led government would effect a
fundamental transformation of property rights that would address the history of disposses-
sion and lay the foundation for the upliftment or the rural and urban poor").
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had been redistributed. It would seem that land reform was not high on
the list of priorities of South African politicians; this was evidenced by the
fact that less than 0.4% of the South African government's budget was
being allocated to redistribution programs.'
Violent land invasions in Zimbabwe refocused the South African
government's attention on the need for land reform. As poverty and un-
employment rose in South Africa, so did tensions between White
commercial farmers and rural Black communities. There has been an in-
crease in stock-theft and grazing ofAfrican communal livestock on White
farms. In one area, it was reported that there were 5000 squatters on
White farms." Between January and August of 2000 there were 586 at-
tacks on White farmers producing 288 injuries and 88 killings, more than
twice the number of deaths in the Zimbabwe land invasions."
In the summer of 2001, several thousand Black South Africans,
instigated by the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC), an opposition political
party, invaded a farm in Bredell. 13 On July 10th, the High Court of
Pretoria ordered the squatters to vacate the land within 48 hours. Two
days later, pursuant to the court order, the local sheriff began forcefully
evicting the squatters, demolishing their makeshift homes.'4 Minister of
Land Affairs, Thoko Didiza, was quoted as saying that the eviction order,
"reaffirm[ed] the democratic principles of the country."' However, the
comments of the squatters left homeless by the court order seemed to
reflect the frustration many Black South Africans feel over the unresolved
land issue. One man complained, "This government is failing its own
people because it is dragging its feet in addressing the land issue."'
1
Another stated, "I am very disappointed with this government. I fought
for my land and now where is it? The ANC is hurting landless and poor
people."'7 Meanwhile, analysts asserted that the Bredell invasion was "a
10. See Kariuki, supra note 5.
11. Heather Boyle, Note, The Land problem: 4hat Does the Future Hold for South Africa's
Land Reform Program? 11 IND. INT'L & COMp. L. REV. 665,666.
12. Attacks are Aimed at Driving Us Off Land: Farmers, SOUTH AFRCAN PRESS ASS'N.,
Nov. 7, 2000, available at 2000WL 27207505.
13. See Land Grabs Will Escalate: TAU, SouTH AFRICAN PRESS Ass'N.,July 9, 2001, (stat-
ing that squatters invaded farms at Bredell with backing of the Pan Africanist Congress)
available at 2001 WL 22187837.
14. Squatters Blast Government amid PAC, WORLD REPORTER, July 13, 2001, available at
2001 WL 23466528 [hereinafter Squatters Blast Government and PAG].
15. Minister Firn on Bredell Removals,WORID REPORTER,JUly 11,2001, available at 2001
WL 23466499.




warning to the Government to address the problem, which it inherited
from the apartheid regime.""
Based upon the premise that land reform is essential to creating
socio-economic equality, easing racial tensions and stemming the tide of
violence in South Africa, this note will provide suggestions for effective
land reform policy. To accomplish this, this Note will examine the paths
taken by several other transitional African governments in land reform
policy. It will attempt to extract practical lessons from their experiences
and apply them towards the development of effective land redistribution
policy in South Africa. Part I of this note will provide a historical over-
view of colonialism and land law in Africa. Part II will examine the post-
colonial land reform policy in Kenya,Tanzania and Zimbabwe and part III
will attempt to extract lessons from the experiences in these countries.
Part IV will seek to apply these lessons towards the development of effec-
tive land reform policy in South Africa. Finally, PartV will again stress the
need for land reform as a means of creating economic equity and racial
harmony.
I. COLONIALISM IN AFRICA:A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW
A. Invasion
In 1875, with the exceptions of Algeria and The Cape (South Africa),
European settlements in Africa promoted the "imperialism of free trade."'
They were a system of low-cost, informally controlled, coastal trading
posts designed to further Europe's mercantile economy. Many even paid
tribute to African rulers for the right to exist in their territory.2 Around
this time, the rising power of unified Germany and Italy, as well as the
imperialist designs of Leopold II in Belgium, initiated a power struggle
among European states.The result was a scramble for colonial possessions
in Africa, which were viewed not only as sources of wealth but also as
symbols of world power. For many Europeans, their perceived superiority
was validated by the conquest of "inferior races." 2' To mediate this scram-
ble, the Berlin Conference was convened in 1884-1885. It established
rules for the settlement of disputes over colonial holdings in the Congo
and Niger basins. Among those rules was the "effective occupation doc-
trine," which required the establishment of a "visible infrastructure on the
18. See Revisit Land Debate, WORLD REPORTER, July 18, 2001, available at 2001 WL
23466562.
19. See CRAWFORD YOUNG, THE AFRICAN COLONIAL STATE IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE
82 (1994) (summarizing the rise of colonialism in Africa).
20. See id.
21. This was attributed partly to "Social Darwinists" who saw conquest of other races
as "the most convincing possible demonstration of [their] own racial superiority." See id. at
SPRING. 2003]
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ground of garrisons that affirmed imperial presence" in addition to the
assertion of sovereignty.
2
To save costs, many European governments delegated colonial sover-
eignty to private companies. In exchange for establishing effective
occupation, these companies were given trade monopolies within their
domain. It was expected that private control of African territories would
eventually give way to imperial sovereignty. The British relied mainly
upon the Royal Niger Company, the British East Africa Company and
the British South Africa Company. The Belgians relied on Anversoise and
the Anglo-Belgian India Rubber Company, which was notorious for its
atrocities in the Congo.
2 1
The European perception of Africans as "savages" helped to justify
the subjugation of the continent. 4 Some asserted that colonial rule, no
matter how brutally it was established and maintained, would ultimately
benefit the Africans by bringing civilization and salvation. In fact, colonial
invasions were often accompanied by Christian missions to "save the
souls" of the Africans.2 - Their agendas were hardly the same, however; it
was Protestant missionaries in the Congo that first reported on the atroci-
ties of colonial invasions. 2 '
Africans were by no means passive in the face of European aggres-
sion: there were large rebellions in Algeria in 1871, 1876, 1879 and 1881
to 1884; the South African Zulu wars took place in 1879 and 1906; in
1905, there was the Maji-Maji revolt in Tanganyika; the Ndebele and
Shona revolts occurred in 1896 and 1897 in Rhodesia; in 1898, there was
the hut-tax war in Sierra Leone; and in British Somaliland, there was a
resistance movement which lasted from 1900 to 1920. There were also
many rebellions in Angola and the Congo." However, only Ethiopia was
able to repel the European onslaught, defeating and embarrassing the
Italian army in the Battle of Adowa.
2
1
B. Colonial Land Law.
Before colonialism, the concept of permanent, indefeasible land
rights amounting to freehold estates was alien to most of Africa,
22. See id. at 96.
23. See id. at 103.
24. See id. at 98.
25. Africa was seen by many Christian evangelists in the late 18th century as "the
largest field of unharvested souls." See id. at 85.
26. See id.
27. See id. at 99.
28. See id. at 89.
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particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa.2 1 In many places, land belonged to the
entire community, not to individuals. 311 While in other areas, land belonged
to the sovereign. 31 In both cases, tribal chiefs or clan elders distributed
land to peasants for farming and building homes. For pastoralists who
grazed their cattle over wide ranges, land, like water or air, belonged to no
one and everyone. The common thread among these African systems of
land tenure was that boundaries were not clearly defined, and there was
no physical documentation of who had rights to the land.
To legalize expropriations in African colonies, the British declared
that African land rights were usufruct, meaning that they only existed
when land was in use. Therefore, any vacant land could be declared
Crown land (property of the European Sovereign) and expropriated for
White settlers.When the British South African Company raided Ndebele
land, the Privy Council went on to declare that usufruct rights did not
amount to ownership under common law and Ndebele tillers therefore
had no private rights to land worthy of protection.3 2 The Germans, in
what became Tanzania, simply declared that land, where ownership could
29. See J. H. M. Beattie, 77te Kibania System of Land Temnre in Bunyoro, Uganda, in I
READINGS IN AFRICAN LAw 324,326 (E. Cotran & Neville N. Rubin eds., 1970).
30. See Amodu Tijani v.The Secretary Southern Nigeria, 11921] 2 App. Cas. 399, 404
(PC. 1921) (appeal taken from Nigeria).
Crucial to understanding native land law is the fact that the notion of individual
ownership is quite foreign to native ideas. Land belongs to the community the village or
the family, never to the individual. All the members of the community, village or family
have an equal right to the land, but in every case, the Chief or Headman of the commu-
nity or village, or head of the family, has charge of the land, and in loose modes of speech
is sometimes called the owner. He is to some extent in the position of a trustee, and as
such holds the land for the use of the community or family. He has control of it, and any
member who wants a piece of it to cultivate or build a house upon, goes to him for it.
But the land so given still remains the property of the community or family and
the Chief or Head man cannot make any important disposition of the land without con-
suiting the elders of the community or family and their consent must in all cases be given
before a grant can be made to a stranger. This is a pure native custom along the whole
length of this coast, and wherever we find, as in Lagos, individual owners, this is again due
to the introduction of English ideas. But the native idea still has a firm hold on the people,
and in most cases, even in Lagos, land is held by the family.This is so even in cases of land
purporting to be held under Crown grants and English conveyances.The original grantee
may have held as an individual owner, but on his death his entire family claims an interest,
which is always recognized, and thus the land becomes again family land. My experience
in Lagos leads me to the conclusion that except where land has been bought by the pre-
sent owner, there are very few natives who are individual owners of land.
31. See Beattie, supra note 29, at 326. Mukama Kabarega, the last ruler of the Bunyoro
kingdom in Uganda before the British invasion, owned all the land and everything in it.
Id.
32. See H.W.O. Okoth-Ogendo, Property and Land-useAnalsis:An Essay in the Political
Economy of Ideas, in AFRICAN LAW AND LC.AL TnEORY 291, 297 (1995).
SPRING, 2003]
536 Michigan Journal of Race & Law [VoL. 8:529
not be documented was ownerless.3 In countries such as Uganda where
the primary aim was not settlement, African land tenure systems were
treated as a form of feudalism. Local rulers and their underlings were
given freehold estates and the rest of the land was declared crown land. 4
During colonial rule, White settlers adopted numerous statutory
schemes to reserve the most fertile land for themselves. For instance, the
Kenya Highlands Order of 1939, essentially reserved 3 million acres of the
best farmland for White settlers,3  and the Land Acts in South Africa
reserved almost 87% of the country's surface area for Whites." Supposedly
due to pressure from international human rights advocates, so-called
"native reserves" were created and treaties were signed with various tribes
to protect African land rights. Unfortunately, reserves were usually too
small and always on the most barren land.The Masaai in Kenya, like most
African tribes, learned the hard way that European treaties were for
Africans to respect and for White settlers to ignore. 7
C. Independence
After World War I1, the myth of European invincibility was severely
weakened. In addition, colonial security forces, many made up primarily
of Africans, had been drained by the demand for manpower during the
war. Africans who had contributed to the war effort, voluntarily or not,
were not content to return home and accept the old status quo.3" Mean-
while, international distaste for colonialism was rising. The U.N. Charter,
drafted in San Francisco in 1945, included references in Articles 1 and 55
to "equal rights and self-determination of peoples." 3 Since the socio-
economic structure of African colonial states was based upon the subordi-
nation of the rights of Black Africans to secure privilege for White settlers,
these provisions were problematic for colonial masters. In addition, Article
73 required colonial masters to "develop the capacity [of colonial subjects]
33. See H.WO. Okoth-Ogendo, Land Policy Development in East Africa: A Survey of
Recent Trends 2 (Paper presented at the DFID Workshop on 'Land Rights and Sustainable
Development in Sub-Saharan Africa' Feb. 16-19, 1999) at http://wvww.oxfam.org.uk/
landrights/EAFOVER.rtf [hereinafter Land Policy].
34. See id. Agreements with the British colonial administration in Uganda "gave local
rulers and their functionaries estates equivalent to the English fee simple, subject however,
to certain obligations in respect of customary law tenants:' Id.
35. See P.D. ABRAMS, KENYA's LAND RE-SwrrLEMENT STORY: How 60,000 African Fami-
lies were Settled on 1325 Large Scale European Owned Farms (1979).
36. See Robinson supra note 4, at 475.
37. See Land Policy, supra note 33, at 3 ("And as the Maasai were to discover to their
detriment, not even 'treaties' similar to those concluded elsewhere in Central and South-
ern Africa, were capable of offering protection.").
38. See YOUNG supra note 19, at 185.
39. See U.N. Charter art. 1 and 55.
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to administer themselves, to take account of the political aspirations of the
populations and to aid them in the progressive development of their free
political institutions.''4 ' '
Successful revolutions in Southeast Asia showed African nationalists
the potential of guerrilla warfare. Using these tactics, a small army with
less sophisticated weaponry could overcome a larger, better-equipped and
better-trained enemy. Victory was gained not by winning battles, but
through a series of small strikes designed to demoralize enemy troops and
force the enemy to exhaust his resources." It was this strategy that was
employed in the Algerian Revolution, which began in 1954. The techni-
cally superior French forces left, largely because their government could
no longer afford to fight. The Mau Mau guerrillas in Kenya forced the
colonial security forces to request the help of regular British troops. Por-
tugal dispatched nearly two hundred thousand troops and diverted half of
its budget to put down revolutions that began in Angola in 1961 and
spread to Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique by 1964.4
2
Faced with the threat of revolution and international pressure to de-
colonize, European powers made preparations to transfer power. Italy was
bound by international covenant to give up Somalia within ten years of
World War II. Spain, after joining the U.N. in 1955, faced pressure to abide
by Article 73, and in 1958 declared its African colonies to be provinces. In
1968, it released Equitorial Guinea (though the new African president
soon became a tyrant) and in 1976 it gave Western Sahara to Morocco.
Portugal, after a military coup in 1974, was simply too weak to hold on to
African possessions. After much conflict, Belgium gave in to Congolese
demands for independence in 1960. The British found itself negotiating
with former "enemies" such as Jomo Kenyatta, Kwame Nkrumah and
Hastings Banda, to bring about a peaceful transfer of power. The French
were fixated on the idea of federalism, offering enfranchisement, French
citizenship and parliamentary representation to Africans in exchange for
remaining "junior partners" with France. This was particularly successful
in Sub-Saharan Africa. After Sub-Saharan states moved to true independ-
ence they maintained relatively close ties with France."
D. The South African Experience
The European invasion of South Africa began in 1652 with the arri-
val of Dutch traders. The Dutch East India Company established Cape
Town essentially as a trading post; however, by the 1760s, with the number
of White settlers increasing, legislation was passed to limit the rights of
40. See U.N. Charter art. 73.
41. See YOUNG supra note 19, at 190.
42. See id. at 203.
43. See id. at 182-204. (providing an overview ofAfrican independence movements).
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Blacks. After years of conflict with Dutch settlers, the British gained com-
plete control of Cape Town by 1806, pushing the Dutch east and north,
where they took land from indigenous communities, heightening racial
tension. Although they were defeated by the British in the Boer War
(1899-1902), Dutch settlers were given partial independence from Britain
in 1910 and then complete independence in 1932."4
Separatist policies began around 1902 with the creation of several
Zulu reserves. The Native Lands Act of 1913, which prohibited Blacks
from owning non-agricultural land (approximately 93% of South African
land), made Blacks perpetual tenants. The Natives Urban Land Act of
1923, which prohibited Blacks from living in urban areas, and the Native
Trust Land Act of 1936, which restricted Blacks from White rural areas,
effectively separated Blacks from Whites."
In 1948 the Apartheid system of racial separation was created. Urban
areas were divided into racial zones and reserves were consolidated into
ten townships. It was not until 1978 that "the first minor segregation
laws" would be repealed due to domestic Black resistance and interna-
tional pressure from the United States and the United Nations.
4'
Perhaps realizing that no country can continue to exist in the midst
of such turmoil, the Apartheid government, under President E W De
Klerk began making preparations for the transition to democracy in the
early 1990s. Several political prisoners, including Nelson Mandela, were
released and many separatist statutes were repealed, including the 1913
and 1936 Land Acts. Conventions to discuss the establishment of multi-
racial, democratic rule were held in 1991 and 1993. This culminated in
democratic elections in 1994, in which Nelson Mandela was elected
president.4"
II. POST-COLONIAL LAND REFORM
A. Resettlement in Kenya
The almost decade long struggle for freedom by Kenya's Mau Mau
rebels came to an end in 1960 with the British agreeing to negotiate the
terms of independence. A conference at Lancaster House in London was
44. See Robinson, supra note 4, at 469 ("The British captured the Cape in 1795.Al-
though the Dutch regained the territory in 1803, it was lost to the British who retained
control through 1910.").
45. See Emily Bourdeaux Smith, Note, South Africa's Land Reform Policy and Interna-
tional Human Rights Law, 19 WIs. INT'L L.J. 267,268-69 (2001).
46. See id. at 270. Notwithstanding the South African government's repeal of minor
segregation laws in 1978, "the government made no significant changes to laws regulating
land ownership until 1990." Id.
47. See Robinson, supra note 4, at 483.
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convened to draft a new constitution. All discriminatory legislation was
abolished, including the Highlands Order of 1939. Many fearful White
farmers were anxious to sell their land and return to Britain, while hope-
ful African farmers were anxious to own fertile agricultural property."
The new Kenyan government agreed to adopt the market-based,
"willing buyer, willing seller" system of land reform devised by R.J.M.
Swynnerton in 1954. Under this system, the government would buy the
land of departing White settlers at the fair market price and then provide
loans so that Blacks could then purchase the land from the Kenyan gov-
ernment. The Kenyan government's agreeing to this program was based
partly on the commitment of the British and the World Bank to help
with funding."
The Kenyan land resettlement program has two main schemes: A
"low-density" scheme and a "high-density" scheme. The low-density
scheme mirrored the Swynnerton Plan, which was aimed at the creation
of a class of Black commercial farmers. Participants in the "low-density"
scheme had to have a high level of agricultural expertise and had to bring
much of their own capital; this resulted in plan participants that were al-
ready relatively well off and well educated. High-density schemes, also
called million acre schemes, came a little later and were aimed at creating
opportunities for the landless masses. Unfortunately, the World Bank was
unwilling to provide funds to assist the participants who had little agricul-
tural expertise and no capital base. Moreover, the Kenyan government
began to recognize the constraints on its own budget. In spite of the lack
of funding, some high-density participants managed to become successful
commercial farmers .5)
The Swynnerton Plan also sought to give Africans formal land titles,
thereby creating European style freehold and leasehold estates. The pur-
pose of this was to provide security of tenure, which many believed would
stimulate agricultural investment, and create a free market in land."1 Un-
fortunately, most of these benefits never materialized-in many places
only the elite took advantage of the title registration process, while cus-
tomary land-tenure systems were maintained in poor communities. The
elite often laid claim to unused tracts of land to the exclusion of weaker,
less-informed groups, particularly pastoralists who used seemingly vacant
land for grazing cattle.5
2
48. See ABRAMS, supra note 35.
49. See id.
50. See Kariuki, supra note 5 (explaining the consequences of low- and high-density
schemes in Kenya).
51. See Julian Quan, The Poverty Impacts of Land Titling in Kenya (Mar. 2000) at
http://www.oxfam.org.uk/landrights/jqkenya.rtf.
52. See Julian Quan, The Importance of Land Tenure to Poverty Eradication and Sustainable
Development in Africa: Sunnary of Findings 2 (Sept. 1997) (explaining that "titling has in fact
weakened the position of the poor, causing land insecurity for subsidiary claimants ...
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B. Villigization in Tanzania
In 1923, faced with a League of Nations mandate requiring the pro-
tection of indigenous land rights, the British declared "the whole of the
lands in Tanganyika [now Tanzania] whether occupied or unoccupied to
be public lands."5 This meant that control and management of all land
was vested in the British Crown through their representative in Tanzania,
the Governor. When Tanzania gained independence in 1961, the land
vested in the President, then Julius Nyerere. In 1962 Nyerere abolished all
freehold estates and converted government leases into rights of occu-
pancy.4
In 1967, Nyerere decided that Tanzania would follow a socialist path
for development. Considered essential to that path was the creation of so-
called ujamaa (Swahili for brotherhood) villages, which were based on
traditional African values of "mutual respect, sharing of basic goods and
services held in common, and the obligation of every body to work." It
was also intended to centralize scattered rural communities, thereby mak-
ing it easier to provide public services such as water, electricity and
education.-
Although originally intended to function as a voluntary program,
villigization was made compulsory by 1973. Force was often used to
move those who would not go into a communal village voluntarily, and
houses were destroyed to prevent people from moving back. In addition,
villigization experienced a multitude of problems; villages sometimes dis-
placed people already living in the area; many villages were poorly
planned and many of the promised government services never material-
ized; people were often sent to villages and told to build new houses
themselves. By 1976, at least 5 million Tanzanians lived in ujamaa villages.
Ironically frustration with village life led to a rise in urban migration.
Notwithstanding the myriad of difficulties, some acknowledge that be-
cause of villigization, certain rural communities did experience an
increased quality of life because of improved access to education and
other social services.56 This suggests that villigization was not necessarily a
Land titling has also dispossessed pastoralists") at http://www.oxfam.org.uk/landrights/
QUANPOV.rtf.
53. See Land Policy, supra note 33, at 2.
54. Id. at 3.
55. See Christy Cannon Lorgen, The Experience of Villagisation: Lessons from Ethiopia,
Mozambique and Tanzania 18 (Jan. 1999) at http://www.oxfam.org.uk/landrights/
Fullreport.rtf.
56. See id. at 21-22 (explaining that villigisation is often imposed on rural areas to
facilitate the delivery of services such as health care and education, which improve the
quality of life for villagers).
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bad idea. Rather, forced participation and poor planning may have re-
sulted in its limited success.
C. Turmoil in Zimbabwe
Zimbabwe's experience with colonialism is perhaps the most similar
to South Africa's. White settlers, led by Ian Smith, declared unilateral in-
dependence from Britain in 1965. Smith's repressive regime resisted both
international pressures to institute democratic rule, and attacks from Afri-
can guerillas. In their fight to hold onto power, Smith's Regime tortured
Black civilians and even bombed refugee camps. 7 At Lancaster House in
1979, the British once again sought to broker an agreement between
White settlers and Black revolutionaries. Among other things, rebel leader
Robert Mugabe and his allies agreed to recognize the legitimacy of White
settlers' land rights and use the "willing buyer, willing seller" model for
land reform as was done in Kenya. Like Kenya, the new government's ac-
ceptance of this stipulation was based in part on British commitments to
help purchase land. 8
There were other considerations that kept the government from in-
stituting radical land reforms. One of Mugabe's leading allies and advisors
was Frelimo in Mozambique, who, based upon his experience, had con-
cluded that White expertise was needed for post-war reconstruction." In
addition, because of international sanctions during the Smith regime,
White commercial farmers produced 90% of the country's food."' Since
many Black peasant farmers had been displaced by the war, the country
could not depend on Blacks to fill the void if White farmers left; radical
land reform could have meant widespread famine.'
57. See Michael Holman, A Shaky Grip on Zimbabwe's Moral High Ground, FINANCIAL
TiMEs,Apr. 13,2000.
58. See Rules of the Game, supra note 3, at 1 ("In this 'crucial capitulation' forced on
him by Britain but also by Mozambique (Which hosted his guerrilla army), Mugabe ac-
cepted the infamous 'willing seller, willing buyer' formula for land reform, trusting that the
British would come forward with the generous funding they seemed to promise.").
59. See Robin Palmer, Land Reform in Zimbabwe 1980-1990, 89 AFRIcAN AFFAIRS 163,
167 (Apr. 1990) [hereinafter Land Reform in Zimbabuel. Palmer explains that:
When Frelimo eventually fought its way to power in 1974/5, there fol-
lowed a mass exodus of Portuguese settlers from Mozambique. Frelimo,
which had done nothing to discourage this exodus at the time, soon came
to regret it, and the very firm advice given to Mugabe's new government
in 1980 was that it should strive hard to retain white expertise and skill,
notably on the land.
Id.
60. See id.
61. See id. This is far less of an issue in South Africa however because of"the relatively
small direct contribution that agriculture makes to the economy (around five percent of
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A moderate resettlement program aimed at settling Black households
on White farms was developed; in 1980, the government announced its
plan to resettle 18,000 Black families in 5 years. By 1982, this estimate had
risen to 162,000 families. Unfortunately, it was around this time that the
number of willing sellers fell dramatically. The White landowners seemed
to realize that they had nothing to fear from the Black government and
were thus no longer scrambling to sell their land and leave. At the same
time, the government was under pressure from the World Bank to cut
spending in order to reduce its budget deficit. By 1989, a total of 52,000
families had been resettled-a far cry from the 1982 estimate.
62
At independence, 6000 White farmers owned 42% of the land.6 3 By
1989, the country's 4319 commercial farmers-which by then included a
few Blacks-owned 29% of the land.6 1 Many members of the Black po-
litical elite, now notoriously corrupt, had secured land for themselves and
had thus become invested in the status quo.6 At least ten government
ministers were members of the Commercial Farmers Union (CFU).66 It
seemed that the issue of land reform was no longer a political priority.
Politicians, however, recognized that it was an important issue to the
masses, and rhetoric concerning the need for redistribution always ac-
companied election campaigns."
In 1992, two years after the expiration of the Lancaster House
agreement, the Land Acquisition Act was passed to allow the government
more power to regulate and expropriate land.6 In 1998, in what many
saw as a move to save his political career, Mugabe created a land
redistribution program that allowed expropriation without compensation;
however, in February 2000 he lost a referendum that would have expanded
his power to expropriate farms. Some have opined that the rejection of
Mugabe's program precipitated the farm invasions led by Chenjerai Hunzvi
and his war veterans." Overall 40 people-34 Blacks and 6 Whites---died
in land invasions and approximately 900 White-owned farms were
GNP)." See Ben Cousins, Why Land Invasions Will Happen Here Too ... 2 (Apr. 2000) at
http://www.oxfam.org.uk/landrights/SAViminv.rtf [hereinafter iy Land Invasions Will
Happen Here Too].
62. See Land Reform in Zimbabwe, supra note 59, at 169.
63. See id. at 165.
64. See id. at 169.
65. See id. at 174.
66. See id. at 175.
67. See id. at 175.
68. See Sipho Sibanda, Land Reform and Poverty Alleviation in South Africa (Paper
presented at the SARPN conference on Land Reform and Poverty Alleviation in South-
ern Africa held at the Hunan Sciences Research Council, Pretoria) http://
www.oxfam.org.uk/landrights/SAstudy.rtf.
69. See Rules of the Game, supra note 3, at 1.
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occupied by Black squatters.7" On November 11th, 2001, Mugabe,
perhaps realizing that his political career depended upon drastic land
reform, used his presidential powers to "side-step the judiciary,' and
ordered 2900 White farmers to give up their land by August 2002.
Presently 1800 White families remain on homesteads in defiance of the
eviction order. Mugabe has suggested that he will be willing to go to war
to enforce the order, stating, "Those who think ... Ian Smith can rally the




Overall, between 1961 and 1975, the Kenyan resettlement program
settled 66,319 Black African families on 1325 White commercial farms.1
2
At first glance Kenya's resettlement program seems like a success story. In
fact, the World Bank continues to hold up Kenya as a model for successful
land reform. 73 However, since the goal of land reform is not simply
changing the racial composition of large landowners but promoting eco-
nomic equity among all races, Kenya is hardly the ideal model. Many
critics caution that the Swynnerton Plan, with its stringent income and
educational requirements and its aim of extinguishing customary land
holdings, was originally designed to create a Black African elite, not eco-
nomic equity." Indeed the low-density scheme, which stuck to the
Swynnerton plan only succeeded in substituting the White elite with a
Black elite with an equally vested interest in the colonial status quo.
With the removal of income and educational requirements, the high-
density scheme seemed to have great potential for creating economic op-
portunities for the poor and landless. However, it seems that the scheme's
success was limited by the market-based system agreed to at Lancaster
House. As time went on and White fears of reprisal were calmed, the
number of willing sellers was insufficient for the scheme to have any real
70. Thomas W Mitchell, The Land Crisis in Zimbabwe: Getting Beyond the Myopic Focus
Upon Black & Wite, 11 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 587, 588; see also Rachel L. Swarns,
Plenty of Pain to Share in Zimbabwe Land Reform, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7, 2001, § 1A, at 4 (re-
porting on the Black invasion ofWhite-owned farms in Zimbabwe).
71. Adrian Blomfield, Mugabe Says He Ready for War Over Farms, WASH. TMES, Aug.
13, 2002, at Al1 available at 2002 WL 2915943.
72. See ABRAMS, supra note 35, at 69.
73. See Robin Palmer, The World Bank, Civil Society and Land Reform (Aug. 2000)
("Kenya was held up as the model to emulate, even though the cracks in the very expen-
sive Kenyan model have long been glaringly apparent") at http://www.oxfam.org.uk/
landrights/Wbcivsoc.rft [hereinafter The World Bank].
74. See Kariuki, supra note 5.
SPRING 20031
Michigan Journal of Race & Law
impact. Those Whites that did sell land only offered the least fertile por-
tions of their property"5
The lack of support from the World Bank for high-density schemes
illustrates the problems of depending on organizations such as these. The
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund have always tended to
withdraw support when a government chooses policy that does not re-
flect their recommendations.16 Furthermore, it is important to remember
that they are essentially banks and are concerned with the repayment of
their loans.This explains why they would not fund a program where the
participants had no capital base (collateral).
B. Tanzania
The experience with Villigization in Tanzania illustrates several issues
of implementation. While communal living may have worked among
tribes and clans that considered themselves family, the creation of artificial
communities by force lacked this unifying factor. This shows the dangers
of romanticizing "the way things were" particularly without a full under-
standing of the social mechanisms that made certain customs work in
traditional societies.
The need for careful planning and the provision of sufficient support
services in any resettlement program is evident. If people who lack exper-
tise are expected to build homes or farms, the government needs to
provide the infrastructure (i.e. water works, electricity etc.) and expertise
(help with construction, irrigation etc).The government must also prom-
ise only what it knows it can deliver. The failure to provide promised
services was a constant source of frustration in villages. In some cases, vil-
lagers even sabotaged production in frustration.7" This also leads to the
realization that paternalistically forcing a program on poor people, sup-
posedly for their own good, only breeds resentment.
C. Zimbabwe
Zimbabwe serves as the primary example of what not to do in land
reform. It demonstrates the inadequacy of market-based land reform in
societies that require massive restructuring in land distribution." The
75. See id.; see also Land Reforn in Zinbabwe, supra note 59, at 169-70.
76. See The World Bank, supra note 73 (explaining that "the Bank has an extremely
chequered history on land reform, manifesting a dangerous combination of arrogance and
ignorance, coupled with an unwillingness to listen seriously to others").
77. See Lorgen, supra note 55, at 22.
78. See The World Bank, supra note 73. Palmer observes that:
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unwillingness of White landowners to sell once they realized that Blacks
were not seeking revenge meant that not enough land was available to
buy. Even if there were willing selers, the increased land prices that
usually accompany political stability increases the possibility that the
government may not be able to afford land at the fair market price
anyway.
7 '
The dangers of political apathy to the land question are also evident
in Zimbabwe. Decades of doing little or nothing to rectify economic
marginalization are bound to frustrate the masses."' Playing politics with
an issue that is so fundamentally linked to the livelihoods of so many peo-
ple is bound to create resentment towards the government as well as those
seen as the beneficiaries of injustice (i.e. Whites). As seen in Zimbabwe,
this frustration often explodes into violence."' This illustrates that if a gov-
ernment neglects to address issues of socio-economic disparity through
peaceful, legal channels, the masses will try to address the issue through
extra-legal channels.
As for the "new" and much-hyped model of "market-assisted" land re-
forms, which involve governments taking a more hands-off approach,
they have conspicuously failed to address either political realities or power
relations on the ground. In Brazil they have done nothing to break the
power of the large landlords, while in post-apartheid South Africa their
scope for securing sustainable rural livelihoods for poor people has proved
to be extremely limited.
Id.
79. See Land Reform in Zimbabwe, supra note 59, at 169-70.
The initial burst of buying in 1981 [to 1983] comprised virtually all the
whole farms which had been abandoned during the war years, mostly in
the war zones of the north-east, plus the farms belonging to those who
feared the worst from the new black government and decided to sell up
and leave just before or just after independence. Not all of the land pur-
chased at this time was suitable for resettlement. After this brief'boom',
very few entire farms or blocks of land became available, which obviously
made advance planning much more difficult.There was also an increasing
tendency on the part of the White farmers who stayed on after independ-
ence to hold onto the productive core of their farms and to offer for sale
only the most marginal parts, which they were happy to dispose of, espe-
cially when land prices steadily began to rise as a result of political
stability.
Id.
80. See Adam Yarmolinsky, 82 HpAv. L. REV. 1793, 1795 (1969) (reviewing Report of
the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders and Supplemental Studies for Na-
tional Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders (1968)). According to Yarmolinsky, "the
Report demonstrates that riots develop primarily out of accumulated resentment against
economic and social inequities." Id.; see also Rush, supra note 2.
81. SeeYarmolinsky, supra note 80.
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IV AVOIDING A LAND CRISIS IN SOUTH AFRICA
A. Post-Apartlheid Land Reform
The South African Department of Land Affairs (DLA), headed by
Derek Hanekon, was created in 1994 to deal with land distribution issues.
The Department of Agriculture remained under the control of its Apart-
heid era minister Kraai Van Neikerk until 1996 when it was combined
with the DLA. 12 Land reform policy under the DLA focused on three
areas: (1) Restitution; (2) Redistribution; and (3) Tenure Reform.1
3
Land restitution focuses on adjudicating the claims of individuals or
communities that were dispossessed by racist laws or practices after June
19, 1913-claims for restitution had to be lodged by December 1998. By
the deadline, 63,455 claims were filed-the discovery that some claim
forms encompassed several claims, increased this number to 68,878. As of
June 2001, only 18% of claims filed had been settled.8 Many felt that the
pace of the restitution program is far too slow.
To speed up the restitution process, the DLA began settling urban
claims first because these claimants were more likely to accept financial
compensation instead of land. This trend is disturbing because rural claims
tend to represent entire communities while urban claims usually represent
individual families.Though rural claims make up only 28% of total claims,
they represent 90% of the people claiming land under the restitution
process.8 5 In addition, critics argue that providing financial compensation
instead of land ignores what should be the real goal, which is providing a
means of creating sustainable wealth."
South Africa's land-redistribution program followed a similar market-
based model as Kenya and Zimbabwe. Grants and loans were provided for
qualifying households to buy land on the open market, which meant that
willing White sellers (who set the price) were required for Blacks to
acquire land. Like Zimbabwe, there was the problem of lack of
government funding (DLA gets 0.4% of the government's budget and
often doesn't use all of it)."7 Like Villigization in Tanzania, there was often
82. See Ruth Hall & Gavin Williams, Land Reform in South Africa: Problems and Prospects
1 (Dec. 2000) ("The National Department of Agriculture (NDA) inherited from the
apartheid past ways of thinking, institutional structures, links to 'organised [i.e. white] agri-
culture' and, initially, key staff and even, from 1994-1996, its Minister.") at
http://www.oxfam.org.uk/landrights/HallWiU.doc.
83. See Lahiff, supra note 9, at 1.
84. See id. at 3.
85. See id.
86. See Robinson, supra note 4, at 484.
87. See Lahiff, supra note 9, at 1.
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a lack of pre-settlement planning and post-settlement services. In addition,
in some cases business plans were forced on participants.
Following the 1999 election,Thoko Didiza became the new Minis-
ter of Agriculture and Land Affairs. In 2000, Didiza initiated a
controversial shift in land reform policy from rural poverty alleviation to
establishing a class of Black commercial farmers." The Commercial
Farmer Program (CFP) was created as the cornerstone of this policy.The
CFP is functionally similar to Kenya's low-density schemes in that partici-
pation requires a minimum level of agricultural expertise and income.,'
Some commentators believe, based upon the Kenyan experience, that the
CFP will only create a Black South African elite without dealing with the
economic marginalization of the majority of the population." To make
matters worse, no additional funds have been made available for the CFP,
leading many to assume that it will fall short on implementation anyway.
Tenure reform is probably the most complex and most neglected
area of South African land-reform policy. Under apartheid, land in Black
The Department of Land Affairs (DLA) has routinely failed to spend its
budget (less than one-quarter of one percent of the national total), result-
ing in reduced funding being made available by the treasury for 2001/02.
This has generally been attributed to severe lack of capacity-particularly
in terms of quality and quantity of staffing-in national and provincial of-
fices of DLA and the Commission on the Restitution of Land Rights
(CRLR).
Id.
88. See Hall &Williams supra note 82.
In 2000, under a new minister, Thoko Didiza, the Ministry produced a
new redistribution policy:An Integrated Programme of Land Redistribu-
tion and Agricultural Development in South Africa. Its language and
proposals shifted the emphasis away from the previous focus of DLA pol-
icy statements on alleviating the plight of the rural poor to the NDA's
new concern to promote agricultural production and commercial farm-
ing by establishing a class of black commercial farmers.
Id.
89. See id. at 2. (explaining that the CFP was "aimed at those with five, or ten, years
experience in agriculture and agricultural diplomas"); see also Wlhy Land Invasions Will
Happen Here Too, supra note 61, at 3 ("The beneficiaries will be relatively well off, aspirant
farmers with 'sufficient net financial worth' (i.e. capital of their own).").
90. See Kariuki, supra note 5. Kariuki predicts that:
Creating a class of black commercial farmers will in essence dovetail into
existing patterns of social inequality, as exemplified in the dichotomised
agricultural sector, with a divide between small and large-scale farmers.
Most importantly, creating a stratum of black commercial farmers without
unlocking the imbalances of power in favor of all within the agri-
economy will only perpetuate the existing agrarian structures biased in
favor of white commercial farmers.
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townships was the property of the state, with allocation being left to tribal
authorities, mimicking traditional tenure systems. As apartheid was com-
ing to an end, the National Party transferred ownership of land to tribal
leaders supposedly for the benefit of the tribe. As a result, in places such as
the former Lebowa homeland, corrupt tribal leaders were able to create
what was essentially a feudal fiefdom."
The South African constitution provides that, "[a] person or com-
munity whose tenure of land is legally insecure as a result of past racially
discriminatory laws or practices is entitled, to the extent provided by an
Act of Parliament, either to tenure which is legally secure or to compara-
ble redress."'12 After the fall of apartheid, a string of legislation was passed
to protect the rights of customary landholders. In 1997, the DLA began
drafting a bill that would vest property rights in those that occupied
communal land, but Didiza scrapped the draft in 1999." While there are
currently rumors that the bill will be resurrected, there is little evidence
to suggest that these efforts have the support of the Minister. 4 Tribal au-
thorities opposed the new bill as a threat to their power.
In a few areas Communal Property Associations and Communal
Trusts were created to manage and allocate land. These are systems where
non-governmental organizations hold land in trust supposedly for the
benefit of the community. However, the DLA in its 1999 review ques-
tioned the ability of trusts to "hold and manage land."'" Furthermore,
critics argue, these new systems are highly susceptible to corrupt tribal
leaders and politicians because they lack mechanisms to hold leaders ac-
countable to land users. "6
91. See Ben Cousins, The New Land Law:A Return to theApartheid Era? (Nov. 2001) at
http://www.oxfam.org.uk/landrights/newlaw.rtf [hereinafter The New Land Law]
The deals were brokered directly between chiefs, the Lebowa cabinet and
the government, without popular consultation.This has resulted in wide-
spread abuse and corruption by the chiefs. In theory the land belongs to
the whole "tribe"; in practice it if operated as a feudal fiefdono.The rule
of law has been replaced by a "rule of fear".
Id. at 2.
92. See SA CONST. 5 25 (6).
93. See The New Land Law, supra note 91, at 1.
94. See Edward Lahiff, Tenure Reform Back on the Agenda? 1-2 (stating that it is clear
that the third draft of the "Land Rights Bill" did not have the approval of the "Department
or the Minister and Delegates") at (Dec. 2001) http://www.oxfam.org.uk/landrights/
Agenda.rtf [hereinafter Tenure Reform Back on the Agendal.
95. See Hall & Williams supra, note 82, at 10.
96. See id. at 6. ("These [community trusts and communal property associations] may
in some cases provide a fictive legal framework behind which political entrepreneurs, civic
organizations, or traditional authorities control the allocation of resources rather than an
effective mechanism for holding decision-makers accountable to their'conmunities. ").
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B. What Can Be Done?
The first step is the most basic, the South African government must
make land reform a priority. Aside from the issue of redressing past injus-
tices, land redistribution is essential to overcoming a legacy of socio-
economic exclusion. The failure to do so can perpetuate racial tensions
that often explode in the form of violence (such as the recent land inva-
sions in Zimbabwe or the Watts and L.A. riots in the U.S.)." Given the
importance of this issue to the future peace and stability of the nation, the
fact that the South African Defense Force (SADF) has fifteen times the
budget of the DLA is unconscionable."
The government must abandon market-based redistribution mecha-
nisms, which always seem to limit the scale of land redistribution
programs. There simply are not enough willing sellers to fulfill the land
needs of the poor. In fact, at the International Conference on Agrarian
Reform and Rural Development in December 2000, there was almost
unanimous rejection of market-based land reform as "blind both to poli-
tics and to power relations on land."9 A shift to a need-based reform
model is necessary to bring about land redistribution on a large enough
scale for it to have an impact on Black poverty and landlessness. This
means that the government must evaluate the land needs of the poor, not
only for farming and grazing but also for building homes, and take af-
firmative steps to fill those needs.
Though government owned land can fulfill some of this need, at
some point they will have to take land from White landowners.This could
be done statutorily, making use of the takings clause of the South African
constitution which allows for the expropriation of property "in the public
interest'"'' which "includes the nation's commitment to land reform, and
... reforms [intended] to bring about equitable access to all South Africa's
natural resources."' To remain in compliance with international norms
and the South African constitution, the government must still provide
compensation. This can prove expensive and therefore limit the scope of
land redistribution. The price does not, however, have to be the current
fair market value, which usually rises with the advent of democracy. The
constitution allows for the consideration of "the history of the acquisition
97. See Rush, supra note 2; cf Yarmolinsky, supra note 80 (discussing how social and
economic inequities can lead to violence).
98. Expenditure estimates for 2001 show that the South African Government allotted
less than 0.4% of expenditures to Land Affairs while allotting almost 6% to Defense. See
South African Government Budget, available at http://wwv.budget.gov.za.
99. See Robin Palmer, Report on International Conference on Agrarian Reform and Rural
Development (ICARRD), December 5-8, 2000 2 (Jan. 2001) at http://www.oxfam.org.uk/
landrights/Agarref.rtf.
100. SA CONST. § 25 (2 )(a).
101. See SA CONST.§ 25 (4)(a).
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and use of the property" in the determination of just compensation. '2 To
keep costs to a minimum, this could be interpreted as allowing compensa-
tion only for improvements made to the land (such as houses or irrigation
systems) since it was expropriated from African owners or, as was done in
Kenya, the market value prior to democratic rule. A more extreme inter-
pretation would be that compensation should be the current equivalent
value of what the present owners' predecessors paid to Africans for the
land, which in almost all cases would be nothing.
Obviously government takings are going to produce conflict.
Regardless of compensation,Whites are bound to resist the destruction of
decades of economic privilege. For the most part, some conflict is
unavoidable but perhaps it can be minimized. One possible way to lessen
internal conflict is by primarily targeting land held by absentee owners
(the number of which is increasing in South Africa) for expropriation.
Since these people are already overseas, their interest in the future of the
country is manifestly diminished. In addition, their absence in South
Africa minimizes the turmoil that they could create locally.
As South Africa is not uniform, needs are likely to vary from region
to region and community to community. For example, tribes that have
traditionally been cattle keepers can be introduced to modern cattle
ranching or dairy farming rather than forced into growing crops. A de-
centralized system of evaluation will therefore be necessary to determine
local needs. It is also probably a good idea to include some community
leaders in the evaluation process. Input from the community itself may
help to avoid the perception that programs are being forced on people by
the government. Tanzania showed us the resentment this perception can
breed. However, care must be taken to ensure that these leaders don't sug-
gest programs that will only bolster their power and wealth without
helping the people.
Tanzania taught us the crucial importance of the careful and the pro-
vision of support services to assist in the development planning of new
Black settlement programs. Giving Blacks land is only the first step. The
government must provide education and agricultural training as well as
create a sufficient infrastructure, including help with construction, where
none exist. Without these services, many settlements will have little hope
of becoming viable productive communities.
Finally, the issue of tenure reform presents several complex issues.
How can the government best protect the rights of customary landhold-
ers? As seen in Kenya, trying to extinguish customary tenure in favor of
freehold estates is largely ineffective and can do more harm than good.
Many fear that the freedom of alienation that comes with the creation of
freehold estates will allow individual tribe members to sell tribal land to
102. SA CONST. 25 (3)(b).
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outsiders (particularly Whites) to the detriment of the community. At the
same time, traditional tenure systems that left allocation entirely up to the
chief or elders are easily corruptible. Some medium is needed that make
tribal leaders accountable to the community for the protection of tradi-
tional land rights.
One option is to adopt the legal framework outlined in the Tanzania
case of Attorney General v. Lohay, where land rights are vested in the com-
munity or community authorities and individual customary rights are
deemed rights of occupancy, which are property rights protected by the
law."3 Occupants would have standing to bring suit against the state,
which includes tribal authorities, in defense of rights of occupancy se-
cured under customary law. Of course, the judicial process is long and
costly; to overcome this obstacle, perhaps the DLA can create regional
oversight committees to arbitrate land disputes and provide assistance to
people bringing claims.
Another option is statutorily defining customary holdings as defeasi-
ble estates that revert back to the tribe if the owner attempts to transfer or
sell land to someone outside the community or dies without leaving any
heirs (which is quite possible in the age of HIV).This would allow indi-
vidual occupants to will land to heirs or transfer it to others within the
tribe, but prevent sales to outsiders. This does not necessarily mean regis-
tering titles, but rather treating customary holdings as defeasible estates
under common law. Individual security of title would thus be created,
while alienation that may adversely affect the community as a whole
would be prevented.
103. Attorney General v. Lohay Akonaay and Joseph Lohay, [1995] TL.R. 80, 90 (Tanz.
High Ct.).The respondents, father and son, had owned land in Arusha under customary
law. The Tanzanian government dispossessed them during a villigization scheme called
"Operation Vijiji." In 1990 they sued for recovery of the land and regained possession of it
by court decree. In 1992, while the government's appeal was still pending the legislature
passed the Regulation of Land Tenure Act, which extinguished all customary land rights.
The High Court of Tanzania found that customary land rights were not rights of owner-
ship but rights of occupancy. However, it was also found that these rights of occupancy
were nonetheless property rights that were protected by the constitution, which required
compensation for government land expropriation.
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CONCLUSION
"To give a man his freedom and to leave him in wretchedness and
ignominy is nothing less than to prepare a future chieffor a revolt of
the slaves. ","
It cannot be stressed enough the important role that land reform can
play not only in ending economic disparities, but also in ending racial
tensions. Perhaps more than any other human rights abuse, dispossession
of land will directly affect the lives of disadvantaged and oppressed com-
munities for generations to come. Entire communities are forced to be
perpetual tenants or to live in the squalor of over-crowed slums with little
hope of escape. In societies where poverty is the result of a history of ra-
cially based socio-economic exclusion, one of the main reasons that poor
Blacks continue to resent Whites is that Whites are perceived as the con-
tinued beneficiaries and Blacks the continued victims of injustice and
oppression. History has shown that this resentment often explodes in the
form of violence, be it riots, land invasions or full-scale revolution."5 The
redistribution of land opens up doors for the poor Blacks to create wealth
of their own thereby alleviating feelings of being marginalized and op-
pressed. It is only at this point, when all races are on equal footing,
economically as well as politically, that true healing can begin.
104. See Rush, supra note 2 (quoting ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILIE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA
373-74 (Henry Reeve trans.,Arlington House 1966) (1835)).
105. See Rush, supra note 2; see alsoYarmolinsky supra, note 80.
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